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X.Ray Malpractice
Lucien B. Karlovec*
D OCTORS TODAY are subjected to many malpractice suits in-
volving non-surgical injuries. Common among these non-
surgical injuries are x-ray injuries. Most of the injuries produced
by x-rays have been excessive skin reactions, i.e., burns, occur-
ring during either diagnostic or therapeutic procedures.' The
improper use of x-rays can produce damage other than skin
burns, i.e., fibrosis (in effect, shrinkage) of internal organs, 2
sterility or prenatal injuries.3
Medical Diagnosis-The Role of X-Ray
An x-ray is not conclusive. A positive result is strong
evidence that an abnormality is present, but a negative result
does not necessarily mean that there are no abnormalities. Con-
clusive diagnosis by x-ray can be made in fracture and lung
cavity cases, but there are other cases in which the x-ray finding
is one of interpretation. The interpretation then depends heavily
upon the competence and experience of the radiologist.
The capacity of x-rays to demonstrate abnormalities in the
body depends upon variations in the density of the substance
through which the rays must pass. The more dense the sub-
stance, the less the penetration of x-rays on their way to the
film or fluoroscope screen.4 Under modern x-ray techniques, since
body contrast does not naturally exist, various contrasts media
must be introduced into the body.
*B.S., Bucknell Univ.; Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Routen v. McGehee, 208 Ark. 501, 186 S. W. 2d 779 (1945)-alleged injury
to the foot by diagnostic use of x-ray; Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App.
2d 795, 176 P. 2d 745 (1947)--diagnostic use for locating sliver in arm;
Merkle v. Kegerreis, 350 Ill. App. 103, 112 N. E. 2d 175 (1953)- therapy
to plantar wart; loss of two toes; Emrie v. Tice, 174 Kan. 739, 258 P. 2d 332
(1953)-therapy to ear, burns on other parts of head; Mullen v. McLaugh-
lin, 4 A. D. 2d 753, 164 N. Y. S. 2d 612 (1957)-therapy for skin disorder,
x-ray dermatitis resulted; Ferrara -v. Galluchio, 5 N. Y. 2d 16, 152 N. E. 2d
249 (1958)-therapy for bursitis, burns.
2 Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Ore. 688, 213 P. 2d 797 (1950) -injury of internal
organs after treatment.
3 Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N. J. Misc. 15, 17 A. 2d 58, rev'd 128 N. J. L. 455,
26 A. 2d 489 (1941)-therapy to the abdomen on the basis of a mistaken
diagnosis; she gave birth to a deformed child.
4 X-ray films, x-ray pictures, x-ray photographs, roentgenogram, are
various terms used, but x-ray is acceptable.
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Many malpractice cases have resulted from improper use of
x-rays during diagnostic procedures, e.g., x-ray burns,5 or failure
to use x-rays for initial diagnosis' or for adequate follow up of
orthopedic problems.' Diagnostic use of x-rays, no less than
their use in therapy, should be a precise operation, with standard
precautions always taken. This is an area of modern medical
practice where precision is mandatory, and failure to provide
sufficient safeguards is negligence.
Medical Treatment-Radiation Therapy
The human body has a cumulative lifetime maximum dosage
which should not be exceeded. Thus before a physician begins
treatment he must ascertain the dosage the patient has received
to date. Such calculation must be precise. The strength of the
x-ray beam, the entry of the beam into the body tissues, the
distance from the x-ray tube to the skin, the depth of the antici-
pated penetration into the body, and the time of each application
to the area treated are factors that must be measured and re-
corded. Calculations of total units of x-ray energy (roentgens)
which have been applied to each area must be made from these
basic data. This is usually done by means of standard charts
made for each x-ray machine. X-ray treatment of the human
body is justified only when there is a specific, well established
indication of its use. No longer does a prudent physician pre-
scribe or administer such treatment as a mere therapeutic trial
in hope that it will cure a condition thought to exist.8
The individual patient must be observed closely during a
course of x-ray treatments for the development of signs of undue
5 Routen v. McGehee, supra n. 1; Bowman v. McPheeters, supra n. 1;
Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Colo. 149. 267 P. 2d 1115 (1954)-injury to leg from
negligent use of fluoroscope in locating bullet; Ballance v. Dunnington, 241
Mich. 383, 217 N. W. 329, 57 A. L. R. 262 (1928)-burn from use of x-ray
in locating needle in foot; Cross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S. W.
924 (1920)-burns resulted from repeated attempts to get satisfactory
roentgenogram of ribs.
6 Friedman v. Dresel, 139 Cal. App. 2d 333, 293 P. 2d 488 (1956); Gresham v.
Ford, 192 Tenn. 310, 241 S.W. 2d 408 (1951); Madis v. Stellwager, 38 Wash.
2d 1, 227 P. 2d 445 (1951).
7 Smith v. Feerer, 117 Ind. App. 304, 70 N. E. 2d 770 (1947); Derr v. Bonney,
38 Wash. 2d 678, 231 P. 2d 637, 54 A. L. R. 2d 193 (1951).
8 Stemmer v. Kline, supra n. 3; Shockley v. Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, 103 N. W.
360 (1905)-x-ray treatment for appendicitis; Becker v. Floersch, 153 Kan.
374, 110 P. 2d 752 (1941)-x-ray treatment allegedly given for tumor in the
abdomen.
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sensitivity or excessive tissue reaction, whose appearance under
most circumstances are a signal to stop or to reduce the intensity
of treatment. The so-called x-ray burns are not true burns in
the usual sense. The changes which occur in living tissue from
x-ray burns are physiologically much different from heat burns,
and a better usage of the term is radiation reaction.
Analysis
It seems clear that cases presenting the question of liability
for injury by x-ray are distinctive from a factual, not a legal
point of view. The general principles of the law of physicans and
surgeons require them to use reasonable skill and care in the
patient's behalf. This is fully applicable in an action against a
physician for x-ray injuries. Thus, a physician in giving x-ray
treatments to a patient owes to the patient the duty to exercise
the ordinary care and skill of his profession, giving due concern
to modern scientific advancement and learning. He impliedly
agrees that no injurious consequence will result from want of
such proper skill, care and diligence. 9
In order to recover for injuries sustained as a result of ex-
posure to x-rays, the plaintiff must prove that the negligence of
the person charged with responsibility for the injury was the
proximate cause of the injury. There must be positive evidence
to support a finding of causal connection between the injury and
any treatment administered by the defendant-physician. 10 In
Christie v. Callahan," the court said that it was for the jury to
determine which of two possible causes produced the injury.
There the x-ray burn evidence was supported by substantial
testimony that the plaintiff's condition could have been caused
either by over-exposure to x-ray or by subsequent injection
given to relieve pain.
In this connection, a main proximate cause defense, by the
physician from whom recovery for injuries by x-ray is sought, is
that the cause of the injury was not the negligence of the
physician, but instead was the unusual and unpredictable sus-
ceptibility of the patient. As to proof of unusual susceptibility,
9 Hazen v. Mullen, 59 App. D. C. 3, 32 F. 2d 394 (1929); Cooper v. Mc-
Murry, 194 Okla. 241, 149 P. 2d 330 (1944).
10 Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Colo. 149, 267 P. 2d 1115 (1954). Cases where
there was no positive proof of causal connection. See Butler v. Rule, 33
Ariz. 460, 265 P. 757 (1928); Doumitt v. Diemer, 144 Ore. 36, 23 P. 2d 918
(1933).
11 75 App. D. C. 133, 124 F. 2d 825 (1941).
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the burden of proof is upon the defendant-physician to prove
that he did not know, and in the exercise of ordinary care could
not have known, that the plaintiff had an idiosyncrasy which
rendered him liable to harm by exposure to x-ray.
12
The broad rules of contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk are applicable in x-ray injury cases. In Kuttner v.
Swanson,13 it was held that there is no ground for a charge to
the jury that the plaintiff was under a duty to exercise ordinary
care to prevent the consequences of defendant's negligence.
There is no contributory negligence where one who has been
injured did not quit the care of the treating physician or fail to
follow his instructions.14
It is clear that one who agrees to undergo x-ray examination
or treatment does not assume the risk of negligence. However
it is to be expected that x-ray burns and other damage to healthy
tissue often will occur during the treatment in spite of the
highest diligence in skill to prevent them. The courts have held
that a patient assumes the risk of a burn from a proper exposure
to the x-ray.' 5
In order to recover for injury following exposure to x-ray,
the plaintiff must prove that the party sought to be charged with
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
In Christie v. Callahan,'6 it was not necessary that plaintiff prove
negligence by direct and positive testimony of x-ray specialists
to specific acts of negligence; circumstantial evidence was suf-
ficient. To meet the burden of proof the plaintiff must merely
produce sufficient evidence for the jury to find negligence with-
out indulging in unnecesary speculation. 17
There is a presumption of due care in favor of the prac-
titioner, which prevails until overcome by evidence to the con-
trary. This was implied in a case of x-ray used for examination.' 8
12 Kuttner v. Swanson, 59 Ga. App. 818, 2 S. E. 2d 230 (1939)-treatment
was not excessive in itself to produce the injury in absence of an idio-
syncracy. Note: case was reversed on other grounds. Ballance v. Dunning-
ton, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N. W. 329, 57 A. L. R. 262 (1928). Those rejecting
the claim mainly on the theory that defendant did not show plaintiff to
have such: Dorr v. Headstream, 173 Ark. 1104, 295 S. W. 16 (1927); Fred-
erick v. Strouse, 299 Pa. 268, 149 A. 318 (1930).
13 59 Ga. App. 818, 2 S. E. 2d 230 (1939).
14 George v. Shannon, 92 Kan. 801, 142 P. 967 (1914).
15 Costa v. Regents of U. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P. 2d 85 (1953);
Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N. W. 329, 57 A. L. R. 262 (1928).
16 75 App. D. C. 133, 124 F. 2d 825 (1941).
17 Berg v. Willett, 212 Iowa 1109, 232 N. W. 821 (1930).
Is Cooper v. McMurry, 194 Okl. 241, 149 P. 2d 330 (1944).
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However, such a presumption does not exist in malpractice
actions, in terms of error of judgment in diagnosis, or in the
treatment prescribed, or in the failure to successfully effect a
remedy or to accomplish as good results as someone else might
have done.19
Expert testimony is essential in order to recover for x-ray
injury. Only those are qualified to testify, as to whether there
was negligence in the method of treatment, who themselves
possess the skill to administer such treatment. 20 Generally, in
the absence of expert testimony a nonsuit is proper.21 However,
in McElroy v. Frost,22 although plaintiff's expert witnesses were
unable to testify specially as to causal connection, there was
ample evidence from which the jury could find that plaintiff's
injuries resulted solely from over-exposure.
The courts are in disagreement as to the proper rule in cases
involving the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Although all the courts
do agree that the doctrine is applicable if the requisite factors
are present, the difference results from procedural methods.
In Sieling v. Mahrer,23 the court held that the doctrine is
inapplicable in an x-ray injury case where the plaintiff has
alleged specific negligence on the part of the defendant.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held to be inapplicable
in a case in which recovery was sought for injuries alleged to
have resulted from exposure to x-rays. Even though the x-ray
machine used by the defendant was under his control and opera-
tion, and the plaintiff received bums, nonetheless the evidence
was insufficient to show that the burn was one which, in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if the defendant had
used due care.2 4 In spite of diligent care in the use of x-ray for
treatment, burns do occur. The reason the doctrine does not
always apply is because expert testimony shows that, on account
of the idiosyncrasies of the x-ray machine, one person of a cer-
tain type and temperament may be susceptible to a burn while
another may not be.
25
19 Davis v. Pittman, 212 N. C. 680, 194 S. E. 97 (1938).
20 McCoy v. Buck, 87 Ind. App. 433, 157 N. E. 456, 160 N. E. 46 (1927).
21 Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute, 102 Cal. App. 2d 293, 227 P. 2d
473 (1951).
22 268 P. 2d 273 (Okla. 1954).
23 113 N. E. 2d 373 (Ohio App. 1953). See Hess v. Millsap, 72 S. W. 2d 923
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
24 Nance v. Hitch, 238 N. C. 1, 76 S. E. 2d 461, 41 A. L. R. 2d 318 (1953).
25 Routen v. McGehee, 208 Ark. 501, 186 S. W. 2d 779 (1945).
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Several courts have applied the doctrine. A Kansas court 26
said that it was not committed to the rule that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur can never be applied to x-ray treatment, but
would consider each case on the basis of facts alleged and evi-
dence adduced. Where everything which produced the injury is
shown to have been under the control and management of the
defendant, and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course
of events does not happen if due care has been exercised, the fact
of the injury itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evidence
to support a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the
defendant.2 7
Courts on many occasions have applied to x-ray injury cases
rules basically very similar to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine with-
out referring to this doctrine by name.28
Conclusion
Many of the old cases of malpractice arising out of the use
of x-rays appear to have been a result both of ignorance of the
patient and general carelessness of the treating physician. Today,
however, with the word radiation much in everyone's mind, the
public is alerted, and the physician need only inform the patient
of the reasonable expectations from this therapy.
26 Emrie v. Tice, 174 Kan. 739, 258 P. 2d 332 (1953).
27 Johnson v. Marshall, 241 Ill. App. 80 (1926); Gray v. McLaughlin, 207
Ark. 191, 179 S. W. 2d 686 (1944).
28 Berg v. Willett, 212 Iowa 1109, 232 N.W. 821 (1930); King v. Ditto, 142
Ore. 207, 19 P. 2d 1100 (1933); Kelly v. Yount, 135 Pa. 528, 7 A. 2d 582
(1939).
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